Dear Probation Officer: May I Get a Puppy Please?

California post conviction blog Criminal Appeal reports on an unreasonable condition of probation being stricken from a drug offender’s conditions of probation.

A California Court of Appeal has stricken the pet-portion of a probation condition requiring a defendant convicted of possession of methamphetamine to “[k]eep the probation officer informed of place of residence, cohabitants and pets, and give written notice to the probation officer twenty four hours prior to any changes.”  (Emphasis Added)

The majority opinion decided that the condition was overbroad and did not relate to the offender’s reason for being on probation in the first place. As in Texas, California courts can add any reasonable condition of probation.

The lone dissenter argued that the rule wouldn’t allow the probation officer to veto the defendant’s decision to get a pet; but I would argue that it does(above and beyond just being a stupid rule). 

My wife got our dog in a park, abandoned as a puppy. If she had been on a Travis County Probation, and subject to this condition, she wouldn’t have been able to give 24 hours notice. Taking the pup home from the park would theoretically subject someone to jail or prison, as a violation of their probation. Folks…can’t we have some common sense, especially when we are talking about drug offenses?

Possession of Marijuana: No Need To Arrest?

Jordan Smith’s always excellent Weed Watch column in this week’s Austin Chronicle focuses on three topics:

  1. 800,000 arrests in the U.S. for marijuana in 2005 (with 88% of them being for simple possession)
  2. Willie Nelson’s recent non-arrest for half a pound of marijuana
  3. The Government’s new anti-marijuana You Tube campaign

Anyone reading this think they could have gotten star treatment for a felony amount of marijuana? If getting a ticket is good enough for Willie, why does everyone else have to be arrested for it?

Intoxilyzer 5000 Source Code: It's a State Secret

Cobb County DUI lawyer Rob Leonard posts an update over at the Georgia DUI Blog about CMI being ordered by a Georgia Judge to turn over the source code for its Intoxilyzer 5000. The State of Georgia is appealing this ruling.

Well…what’s the “source code” mean anyway? It’s basically the software that tells the machine how to interpret the physical data it receives from the defendant’s breath, and how to convert it to BAC. The number it spits out (.041, .086, .119) is then compared to the so called “legal limit” of .08, to see whether the defendant is per se guilty of DUI. 

Defendants often want to be able to see how the machine analyzed their breath. CMI has fought and fought in courts all over the U.S. to keep this information secret. Apparently, we are supposed to take the manufacturer’s word that the machine is perfect.

Austin Police Department Starts Targeting Certain Bars Again

KXAN NBC reports that the Austin Police Department is keeping a list of the bars that last served DWI suspects. They get the information during the questioning of the suspect on scene and prior to the arrest.

"We try to get these officers to ask them, 'Where have you been drinking?' If it's a business establishment. To give us an idea of are there any violations at those businesses that are already serving to people intoxicated?" APD Lt. Craig Cannon said.

APD then hands over the information to TABC. At first blush, this may not sound unreasonable. The problem lies in the method of collecting the data. Once certain bars are targeted by a police department, that becomes the area that DWI task force officers patrol. More officers in a certain area means more detentions, more arrests, and more arrests for DWI. Then more DWI suspects report their last drink came from one of the bars on the list.

As soon as a list is first established, and without using a random or statistically significant sample size, it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. The current top five on the list are Cedar Street, Rain, Club Carnaval, Blind Pig and Oilcan Harry’s.

How Not To Try A Case

Hat Tip to Andrew Bluestone of New York Attorney Malpractice blog for finding this juror’s post after a case. I always find that listening to jurors’ views after a case is extremely important. You can always improve what you did at trial. The same is true for cases you weren’t involved in. Points from the juror:

  • “The attorneys on both sides of my case were ill-prepared and disorganized. An hour spent before trial formulating an outline for their presentation of evidence and organizing documents could have turned this three-day trial into an afternoon.” Think how well one side could have done, if they had prepared and the other hadn’t.
  • “The top concern on most jurors’ minds is getting back to their normal lives in a timely manner. If either side had displayed through their actions that they valued the court’s time, it might have won them the case.” The quote says it all.
  • “The plaintiff’s counsel used closing arguments to put on an angry show, snarling as he proclaimed his disgust at the defense. Even though his words rang true, the melodrama turned off and alienated most of the jury.” While it might make for good TV lawyering, this sort of bluster almost always annoys jurors – and that can’t be good for your client.
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More Propaganda From Your Drug Czar...

From the Christian Science Monitor, the title of this article says it all: “Plan Columbia: big gains, but the cocaine still flows…”

The “big gains” part consists of the assertions of the White House Drug Czar John Walters:

"There is absolutely no question we are winning …We are squeezing them. We are forcing them to change their drug trafficking routes and their methods," says Walters.

Wait a minute… changing their routes, their methods??? …as for the “cocaine still flows” part of the article:

There is no lack, after all, of coca. Despite the unprecedented eradication efforts, coca cultivation actually increased last year by 8 percent, according to a study released in June by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)… Why? Growing techniques have improved over the years and farmers in some regions are now able to harvest coca leaf six times a year, instead of the usual four harvests.

(Check out the chart in guest poster Daksya's entry over at DrugWarRant for more on the numbers. )

Near the end of the article comes this last quote.  When even the apologists make statements like these, maybe people will wake up and realize what a colossal waste the so called war on drugs is:

"We're making first downs," US Ambassador to Colombia William Wood is fond of saying, "...but we're not sure how long the football field is."

Someone needs to tell Walters and Wood that 10 yard first downs will never win... on an infinitely long field.

The Dangers of Using SWAT Tactics

Radley Balko over at The Agitator posts three examples about the dangers of paramilitary police raids.

Even in the last example, where the police (supposedly) had the right “target”, is this sort of military force necessary when we’re talking about $60 worth of marijuana?

Sleep Apnea and Driving While Intoxicated (DWI)

Washington, D.C. personal injury lawyers Regan Zambri and Long write a post about a study in the American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine regarding patterns of sleep apnea in truck drivers. Criminal Defense practitioners should take note of this study as well:

When the participants took driving tests, those who suffered from sleep apnea had motor skills impairments consistent with drunk driving. Of the truckers with sleep apnea, one-third of them also experienced attention lapses comparable to intoxication.

Oftentimes, when police find someone who has “passed out behind the wheel”, they jump to the conclusion of intoxication. DWI defense lawyers need to be aware of all the possible reasons someone may seem intoxicated, when in fact they are not.

Preachers against Marijuana... What about kaneh-bosm?

Stan White writes a Letter to the Editor of the Central Kentucky Newsletter decrying a pastor’s previous letter bashing medical marijuana. I’m interested myself in looking into his claim that the kaneh-bosm mentioned in the Old Testament is actually cannabis, but for now, I’ll leave you with this quote:

Biblically, caging humans for using cannabis (kaneh bosm) is a sin and for clergy to support cannabis persecution, prohibition and extermination is very regrettable.

Biblically, morally, ethically and also, just from the standpoint of “Your Tax Dollars At Work”, I have to agree with him.

El Paso Prosecutor Focuses on "Rehabilitation"

The El Paso County Attorney Jose Rodriguez defends his decision to subject a 16 year old female juvenile to the threat of a 40 year sentence for attempting to smuggle cocaine across the border:

"Proceeding under (the) determinate sentencing statute in this case demonstrates that we will not tolerate these types of crimes, and should serve as a warning to those teens who might be tempted by the money being offered by the drug cartels," Rodriguez said.

Anyone out there believe this has any shot at deterring 16 year olds from doing foolish things?

Rodriguez also points out that she may get less than 40 years, possibly even probation, despite his decision to certify her as an adult offender. Why then does he not let her face imprisonment until she’s 21, under the juvenile statutes?

"We simply wanted to give jurors an option for a wider sentence," Dominguez said. "Our emphasis is not on incarcerating juveniles but on rehabilitating them."

So…seeking more than five years for a juvenile drug offender is emphasizing rehabilitation not punishment?

Austin Criminal Defense Lawyers Association Elections

Austin Criminal Defense Lawyers Association elected new board members for the year recently. The three new full board members elected were: Gus Garcia, Virginia Greenway and Katie Salzer. The three associate board members elected were: Oscar Buitron, Charlie Grant and Keith Lauerman. Congratulations go out to all these local Austin defense attorneys. I know they will do well for the organization.

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Why We Need Criminal Defense Attorneys

The New York Times today ran a story today called Broken Bench. Look no further than this article to find what a “justice system” without proper safeguards can bring.  The list of legal horrors includes (but, as they say "is not limited to"): defendants being denied their right to counsel, the equivalent of debtor's prisons, unsworn and unrecorded testimony, racial and sexual bigotry, and it goes on and on...

Checks and balances; those are what a system that includes a proper defense provides for.

And yes, this is in the United States of America.

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Class B Misdemeanor Range of Punishment - Texas Penal Code

§ 12.22. CLASS B MISDEMEANOR. 

An individual adjudged guilty of a Class B misdemeanor shall be punished by:

            (1) a fine not to exceed $2,000;

            (2) confinement in jail for a term not to exceed 180 days; or

            (3) both such fine and confinement.

Bad Omen for Jeffrey Skilling?

White Collar Crime Professor points out some tidbits in the resentencing opinion of Dynegy exec Jamie Olis, which may signal bad news for Jeffrey Skilling. In explaining the reasons for lowering Olis’ sentence from 24 years to a “mere” 6 years, Federal District Court Judge Sim lake writes:

…unlike some other recently publicized corporate fraud cases, the purpose of this conspiracy was not to defraud Dynegy or to enrich Olis. Nor did the conspiracy cause Dynegy to file for bankruptcy… Although these facts do not detract from the seriousness of the crime for which Olis was convicted, they mitigate against the type of harsh sentence that may be deserved in cases where the defendant’s conduct enriched him at the company’s detriment or brought about the downfall of the company.

The opinion also points out that Olis deserves a lower sentence because the fraud involved was not meant to defraud the company or its shareholders, and not meant to enrich the defendant. Worse still for the former CEO of Enron?... The author of these words himself is scheduled to sentence Skilling on October 23rd.

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The difference between probation and parole

The difference between probation and parole is enormous, although some people use the terms interchangeably. (Journalists often have an unfortunate habit of falling into that category.)

While there’s more to it than this, the short version is: probation means the judge orders someone to report to some form of supervision immediately, and if they don’t follow a fairly lengthy set of rules and regulations they are subjected to going to jail or prison. Parole is a form of supervision granted to defendants, either after their full prison sentence is complete, or, as in Texas, in lieu of finishing their entire sentence.

Again, probation: supervision as the penalty itself; and parole: a period of supervised release after being incarcerated.

Three types of jails and prisons in Texas

There are three types or categories of jails and prisons in Texas: county jail, state jail and prison. Offenders convicted of Class B and Class A misdemeanors are sentenced to county jail, those convicted of State Jail Felonies are sentenced to state jail, and those convicted of Third Degree Felonies or higher are sentenced to prison.

Absent unusual circumstances (capital murder), the judge usually has the option of probating the sentence, placing the defendant on community supervision, and requiring the person to comply with the many conditions that probation entails. The penalty for violating the terms of probation, however, include serving up to the maximum sentence available for the offense.

Possession of a Cell Phone by Inmate in Texas Prison - Texas Penal Code Section 38.11

(This post only quotes Subsection J of 38.11, dealing with cell phones)

§ 38.11. Prohibited Substances and Items in Adult or Juvenile Correctional or Detention Facility or on Property of Texas Department of Criminal Justice or Texas Youth Commission

            (j) A person commits an offense if the person while an inmate of a correctional facility operated by or under contract with the Texas Department of Criminal Justice or while in the custody of a secure correctional facility or secure detention facility for juveniles possesses a cellular telephone or other wireless communications device or a component of one of those devices.

Mitch Jackson and MyTrialBlog

Mitch Jackson’s MyTrialBlog provides useful tips for litigators, and several of his recent posts contain ideas applicable to my criminal trial practice as well. Examples that could be used for a DWI trial include:  pre-trial preparation, handling overruled objections in front of a jury and issuing challenges to the prosecutors during closing statements.

(Hat tip to South Carolina Trial Law Blog for pointing me to the site.)

The Gateway Theory - Correlation does not prove Causation

The “Gateway Theory” of marijuana prohibition goes like this: marijuana use leads to “hard drug” use, such as cocaine and heroin. Since cocaine and heroin use are “bad”, we must criminalize marijuana to keep our children (and perhaps ourselves) from becoming hard core drug addicts.

The proof of the Gateway Theory is supposed to lie in the statistics that show that cocaine and heroin users in large part started out using marijuana. Since correlation (apparently) proves causation, marijuana use in teenagers and young adults therefore causes “hard drug” use later on.

Like most logical fallacies, when presented artfully, this can be a persuasive rhetorical device: it appears that the proponent of the theory is correct. Cocaine and Heroin users have a very high incidence of marijuana being their first illegal drug of choice. There must be a causal connection.

Let’s ignore for now the refutation that a higher percentage of cocaine and heroin addicts consumed alcohol than marijuana, and we all “know” that alcohol use does not cause cocaine or heroin addiction… (since many readers, like me, are occasional alcohol consumers who have never tried cocaine or heroin)

Let me ask you this: don’t you think the percentage of cocaine and heroin users that drank milk sometime in their lives (before use of the drug) is probably almost 100%?

Correlation does not prove causation. That’s just another logical fallacy brought to you by the Drug Czar.

A thank you to all the guys at LexBlog

The good folks over at LexBlog have done a terrific job of designing the look, not to mention the technical aspects, of my new blog.

Here’s a shout-out to the people that I know were involved: Kevin, Ryan, Jesse and Colin. I’m sure there were several others who contributed as well, so, let me give them an anonymous thank you as well.

I appreciate the good work you guys have done, and I’m sure this blog will be able to fulfill its purpose: to inform the general public about important news items and developments in criminal law, especially here in Austin, Texas.

Thanks again guys!

Logical Fallacies and Marijuana Decriminalization

When you catch someone in a deliberate lie, don't you distrust the rest of their message?

Opponents of the marijuana decriminalization movement are fond of using straw man arguments.  These deliberate mischaracterizations tend to fall into two broad categories: (1) "They just want to smoke dope", and (2) "They want your children to become addicts/dope fiends".

While I'm sure there are casual marijuana users who support legalization, the first argument ignores all the economic, social and moral reasons we should have a more sensible drug policy.

Jordan Smith's Weed Watch column in this week's Austin Chronicle highlights an example of the second type of straw man argument.  Here is the entire text of the question being submitted to Colorado voters:

Shall there be an amendment to 18-18-406 (1) of the Colorado Revised Statutes making legal the possession of one ounce or less of marihuana for any person twenty-one years of age or older?

However, opponents of Amendment 44 have managed to write the language of Colorado's voter-education pamphlet to "explain" that the amendment would allow adults to give marijuana to teenagers.  Go ahead... re-read the text of the amendment.  Now ask yourself this:

If propronents of continuing the criminalization of marijuana were being honest, would they have to resort to such tactics?

Definition of False Report to a Peace Officer - Texas Penal Code

§ 37.08. FALSE REPORT TO PEACE OFFICER OR LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEE.

(a) A person commits an offense if, with intent to deceive, he knowingly makes a false statement that is material to a criminal investigation and makes the statement to:

(1) a peace officer conducting the investigation; or                       

(2) any employee of a law enforcement agency that is authorized by the agency to conduct the investigation and that the actor knows is conducting the investigation.

(b) In this section, "law enforcement agency" has the meaning assigned by Article 59.01, Code of Criminal Procedure.

(c) An offense under this section is a Class B misdemeanor.

Definition of Public Intoxication - Texas Penal Code Section 49.02

§ 49.02. PUBLIC INTOXICATION. 

(a) A person commits an offense if the person appears in a public place while intoxicated to the degree that the person may endanger the person or another.

(b) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the alcohol or other substance was administered for therapeutic purposes and as a part of the person's professional medical treatment by a licensed physician.

(c) Except as provided by Subsection (e), an offense under this section is a Class C misdemeanor.

(d) An offense under this section is not a lesser included offense under Section 49.04.

(e) An offense under this section committed by a person younger than 21 years of age is punishable in the same manner as if the minor committed an offense to which Section 106.071, Alcoholic Beverage Code, applies.

Around the Blogs

Starting a new type of post today that I envision calling "Around the Blogs"...(although I'm open to suggestions)

Here goes the first one:

San Diego DUI lawyer posts about his ideas on Stopping Drinking and Driving.

Even if it's apocryphal, Richmond, Virginia prosecutor Tom McKenna's post makes for an excellent lawyer war story.

Florida Defense Attorney Albert Clifford blogs on the public's double standard applied to male and female sex offenders.

Former prosecutor Sarena Straus has fun with looking at one of her referers.

Total DUI comments on the MADD controversy over the new NHTSA slogan "Drunk Driving. Over the Limit. Under Arrest."

And finally,  Washington Public Defender has a tongue in cheek (but grounded in reality) post on dealing with the family members of the accused.

 

Civil forfeitures admittedly a failed tactic

Posey County Prosecutor Jodi Uebelhack brags about Posey County, Illinois' new forfeiture program in this story from WFIE Evansville Channel 14 news.  I'll leave commenting on the wisdom and ultimate fairness of seizing assets from "suspected" but not yet convicted drug dealers for another post.  But check out the quote from the County prosecutor at near the end of the article:

"It may well deter using the vehicles. I don't know that it will deter the drug dealing," says Uebelhack.

Isn't that an admission by the state that this tactic on the so called "War on Drugs" is a failure?  It's all about supply and demand; and here's the prosecutor admitting that civil forfeiture of assets in drug cases won't help solve the problem itself.

Right to an Expunction Article 55.01 - Texas Code of Criminal Procedure

Article 55.01. RIGHT TO EXPUNCTION.

(a) A person who has been placed under a custodial or noncustodial arrest for commission of either a felony or misdemeanor is entitled to have all records and files relating to the arrest expunged if:

            (1) the person is tried for the offense for which the person was arrested and is:                       

               (A) acquitted by the trial court, except as provided by Subsection (c) of this section; or

               (B) convicted and subsequently pardoned; or                           

             (2) each of the following conditions exist:                                  

   (A) an indictment or information charging the person with commission of a felony has not been presented against the person for an offense arising out of the transaction for which the person was arrested or, if an indictment or information charging the person with commission of a felony was presented, the indictment or information has been dismissed or quashed, and:

      (i) the limitations period expired before the date on which a petition for expunction was filed under Article 55.02; or

     (ii) the court finds that the indictment or information was ismissed or quashed because the presentment had been made because of mistake, false nformation, or other similar reason indicating absence of probable cause at the time of the dismissal to believe the person committed the offense or because it was void;

(B) the person has been released and the charge, if any, has not resulted in a final conviction and is no longer pending and there was no court ordered community supervision under Article 42.12 for any offense other than a Class C misdemeanor; and

(C) the person has not been convicted of a felony in the five years preceding the date of the arrest.

(a-1) Notwithstanding Subsection (a)(2)(C), a person's conviction of a felony in the five years preceding the date of the arrest does not affect the person's entitlement to expunction for purposes of an ex parte petition filed on behalf of the person by the director of the Department of Public Safety under Section 2(e), Article 55.02.

(b) Except as provided by Subsection (c) of this section, a district court may expunge all records and files relating to the arrest of a person who has been arrested for commission of a felony or misdemeanor under the procedure established under Article 55.02 of this code if the person is:

            (1) tried for the offense for which the person was arrested;

            (2) convicted of the offense; and

            (3) acquitted by the court of criminal appeals.

(c) A court may not order the expunction of records and files relating to an arrest for an offense for which a person is subsequently acquitted, whether by the trial court or the court of criminal appeals, if the offense for which the person was acquitted arose out of a criminal episode, as defined by Section 3.01, Penal Code, and the person was convicted of or remains subject to prosecution for at least one other offense occurring during the criminal episode.

(d) A person is entitled to have any information that identifies the person, including the person's name, address, date of birth, driver's license number, and social security number, contained in records and files relating to the arrest of another person expunged if:

            (1) the information identifying the person asserting the entitlement to expunction was falsely given by the person arrested as the arrested person's identifying information without the consent of the person asserting the entitlement; and

            (2) the only reason for the information identifying the person asserting the entitlement being contained in the arrest records and files of the person arrested is that the information was falsely given by the person arrested as the arrested person's identifying information.

Definition of Unlawfully Carrying a Weapon (UCW) - Texas Penal Code

§ 46.02. UNLAWFUL CARRYING WEAPONS.

(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly carries on or about his person a handgun, illegal knife, or club.

(b) Except as provided by Subsection (c), an offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

(c) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree if the offense is committed on any premises licensed or issued a permit by this state for the sale of alcoholic beverages.

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Drug Czar blog gets it wrong again

The Office of National Drug Control Policy's blog 'Pushing Back' posted an entry where they ask "Marijuana near schools: Harmless?"

Read the Sacramento TV News station's story that the Drug Czar points to, and ask yourself this:  Was it the marijuana that 'caused' the gun problem?  Or is the fact that marijuana is criminalized what 'caused' these folks to bring handguns and an assault rifle with them?

There are truckers all over the highways across America transporting tons of legal substances (coffee, tea, etc.) that don't feel the need to arm themselves this way.  But if caffeine products were illegal, wouldn't it be the law itself that caused the transporters of the coffee and tea to arm themselves, and not the caffeine itself?

Bill Maher on the Drug War

Bill Maher has an excellent short piece over at the Huffington Post about how America's War on Drugs is actually fueling the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

The larger point here is that it is the criminalization of drug use itself that causes the most harm.  Yes, the drug users are harming themselves by "choosing" to use drugs.  But the street violence and drain on the treasury, which are the effects that the rest of us feel, would almost disappear if we had a sensible drug policy.  And now, we can add the War on Terror itself as one of the Drug War's casualties.

Driving While License Suspended (Invalid) - Texas Transportation Code Section 521.457

§ 521.457. Driving While license Invalid (Suspended)

(a) A person commits an offense if the person operates a motor vehicle on a highway:

(1) after the person's driver's license has been canceled under this chapter if the person does not have a license that was subsequently issued under this chapter;

(2) during a period that the person's driver's license or privilege is suspended or revoked under any law of this state;

(3) while the person's driver's license is expired if the license expired during a period of suspension; or

(4) after renewal of the person's driver's license has been denied under any law of this state, if the person does not have a driver's license subsequently issued under this chapter.

(b) A person commits an offense if the person is the subject of an order issued under any law of this state that prohibits the person from obtaining a driver's license and the person operates a motor vehicle on a highway.

(c) It is not a defense to prosecution under this section that the person did not receive actual notice of a suspension imposed as a result of a conviction for an offense under Section 521.341.

(d) Except as provided by Subsection (c), it is an affirmative defense to prosecution of an offense, other than an offense under Section 521.341, that the person did not receive actual notice of a cancellation, suspension, revocation, or prohibition order relating to the person's license. For purposes of this section, actual notice is presumed if the notice was mailed in accordance with law.

(e) Except as provided by Subsection (f), an offense under this section is a misdemeanor punishable by:

(1) a fine of not less than $100 or more than $500; and

(2) confinement in county jail for a term of not less than 72 hours or more than six months.

(f) If it is shown on the trial of an offense under this section that the person has previously been convicted of an offense under this section or an offense under Section 601.371(a), as that law existed before September 1, 2003, the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.

(g) For purposes of this section, a conviction for an offense that involves operation of a motor vehicle after August 31, 1987, is a final conviction, regardless of whether the sentence for the conviction is probated.

Co-Defendant in Lawrence v. Texas dies

The New York Times announces the untimely death of one of the co-defendants in Lawrence v. Texas with the headline "Tyron Garner, 39, Plaintiff in Pivotal Sodomy Case, Dies".

It may seem to the public that Lawrence and Garner were plaintiffs, because they were the appellants, and their names are listed first on this famous case.  However, let us not forget that in truth they were criminal defendants, who had been convicted of the criminal offense under Texas law at the time of "Homosexual Conduct". 

Yes, Lawrence and Garner will be remembered as standing up for their civil rights.  But it's important to remember that the case actually revolved around whether or not Texas could constitutionally criminalize consensual, adult homosexual activity.  This is spelled out quite clearly as the issue presented to the court, in the fifth sentence of Justice Kennedy's majority opinion:

The question before the Court is the validity of a Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct.

The fact that it was "only" classified as a Class C criminal misdemeanor, doesn't mean that Texas couldn't have made it a more serious criminal offense.  The arguments the State used to justify its position would have also justified making this felonious conduct.  After all, Garner and Lawrence were arrested and taken to jail based on this statute.  Thankfully, the U.S. Supreme Court took the opportunity to overrule Bowers v. Hardwick.

Sadly, I should also point out that the Times is also reporting that former Texas Governor Ann Richards has died at the age of 73.

Should the State be required to videotape confessions?

Virginia House Assembly Delegate member Albert C. Eisenberg published an article today for the Connection Newspapers outlining his plan to introduce legislation requiring the State of Virginia to videotape confessions of juveniles in felony cases.  Cleverly titled "Let's go to the Videotape", the article contains statistics such as these:

Northwestern University conducted the most comprehensive study of exonerations ever done. It found alarming results. Of 340 U.S. exonerations between 1989 and 2003 the youngest suspects, those aged between 12 and 15, confessed falsely 69 percent of the time. Older juveniles gave false confessions almost half the time.

William J. Stejskal, Ph.D., director of the Psychology Institute of Law, Psychiatric and Public Policy at the University of Virginia is also quoted:

When the only records of custodial interrogations consist of the variable recollections of the participants, or some handwritten notes that were produced under ambiguous or dubious circumstances, unjust and undesirable outcomes can occur.

False confessions, while somewhat unusual, create serious injustice in our society.  Certainly the ease with which the State could videotape the circumstances and actual words a defendant uses while "confessing" demand the remedy.  How hard is it nowadays to tape a subject that is actually confessing?  And why limit this tool to juveniles or felony cases?

Prostitution Banishment Zones

Ken Lammers over at CrimLaw posted about Richmond, Virginia's efforts to create Prostitute-Free Zones.  Once again, what at first seems like a good idea, and certainly makes for good political grandstanding, turns out to be a poorly thought out idea.  Some quotes from the Richmond Times-Dispatch story on the subject:

"Getting a conviction on prostitution is somewhat difficult -- even making an arrest," 3rd District Councilman Chris A. Hilbert said. "You can't make that initial arrest any easier, but banishment for someone's mere presence in these zones could help to curb the problem and prevent people from coming back and harming these neighborhoods...We ought to be focused on not just getting tough on crime, but getting smart on crime."

Apparently, the police can't always develop reasonable suspicion to detain "known prostitutes" who are merely existing in certain areas, so the Councilman believes we should get rid of the basic idea in criminal law, called reasonable suspicion to detain, that the police have to have some sort of justification to stop and investigate you for criminal activity.

As to getting smart on crime, how about this: let's ban certain people from various neighborhoods in a particular city.  Wait a minute, that's not fair to the other parts of the city.  Let's ban them from the entire city.  But wait, prostitution is illegal county wide.  This known prostitute, who is not currently violating the law should be banned from the entire county.  Oh wait, Prostitution is illegal all across the state... and the country...

In jail 8 months on a 90 day sentence for prostitution

Obviously this story from the Florida Ledger is only "newsworthy" because it involves the mother of a child whose brutal murder captured the attention of the national news.  Apparently the mother of Carlie Brucia was recently sentenced to 90 days in jail for prostitution and possession of drug paraphernalia.

I'm blogging about it, however, for these two disturbing lines near the end of the story...

Schorpen was arrested Jan. 19 by an undercover police officer in St. Petersburg who suspected her of prostitution although she did not offer sex for money.  She has been in jail since her arrest and will get credit for time served.

Credit for time served?  The story came out on September 7th, which is nearly 8 months after her arrest, and she has been in jail this entire time?  Also, I don't know the definition of prostitution in Florida, but here in Texas, the definition of prostitution is offering sex for money.

Three months is a lengthy sentence for this type of criminal offense, and I'd bet it seems even longer, when you have to wait eight months in jail for ninety days backtime.

Compulsory Process and the Right to Confront the Witness

Kudos to the Indianapolis Star Newspaper for including the text of the Sixth Amendment alongside a story about the conviction of a sex offender being overturned.

Perhaps the most important quote in the story (likely to be missed by the casual reader) is

He now faces a retrial in Hamilton County.

This defendant (let’s assume he is guilty) will not be “getting away with it”, which is what I suspect the prevailing reaction of readers will be. He will simply face retrial on the same charge, but with all the protections all American citizens face when they are accused.

The “kudos” are for whatever journalist or reporter decided to quote the text of the Sixth Amendment for readers to see along with the substantive story itself. I applaud any effort to educate the American public about their rights, even when those rights apply to people they inherently and instinctively abhor. The rights they take away from the guilty, are the rights they take away from you when you are innocent but accused.

How Much Should You Tell The Prosecutor?

Blonde Justice has a recent post where she, in effect, asks the question “How much should I tell the Prosecutor about my case?”.  Her answer: it depends on the Prosecutor.  I agree with her.  Read her post for her example, but here’s mine:

 

Let's say hypothetically speaking that I have a DWI case where the officer on scene is evaluating whether or not my client was intoxicated.  At one point, before arresting my client, the officers says something that helps my client’s case immensely.  Also, it's nothing so outrageous as "I'm not sure this guy is intoxicated"; it's just something that helps my case.

 

My dilemma is this: do I point out to the prosecutor what it is that the officer says, and explain how that helps my case?  If I do that, and they refuse to dismiss the DWI, I have no doubt that they will bring up that portion of the videotape and show it the officer before he testifies. 

 

If the officer knows beforehand what I’m going to ask him about his statement, I’m sure I’ll hear a different explanation than if I set him up correctly on cross examination, and bring it out for the first time in front of the jury.

 

If I felt confident that the prosecutor would fairly evaluate the entire videotape of my client on the scene, taking intop consideration the officer's statement, then I would have no hesitation in using that as a bargaining chip.  As Blonde Justice said, it all depends on your relationship with that particluar prosecutor.

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Due Process Anyone?

A scary story reported by the Toledo Blade about what sounds to me like a "no due process" branding of citizens with the label of sex offender.  The Corrections Sentencing blog pointed me to this story in the local Ohio newspaper, which includes the quotes:

A recently enacted law allows county prosecutors, the state attorney general, or, as a last resort, alleged victims to ask judges to civilly declare someone to be a sex offender even when there has been no criminal verdict or successful lawsuit.

and

A civilly declared offender, however, could petition the court to have the person's name removed from the new list after six years if there have been no new problems and the judge believes the person is unlikely to abuse again.

OK.  So from the frist part I gather someone in Ohio thinks it's a good idea to brand someone a Sex Offender, without a trial or even a civil lawsuit?  Does the accused even get to know he is about to be labeled a Sex Offender, or is this some sort of crazy ex parte hearing?  What standards does a judge use to label this person a Sex Offender?  Can the accused present his side of the story?

The second quote, however, lets us know it's OK because, if someone who has a grudge against you gets a judge to label you a pervert, you have a possible remedy... 6 years down the road.

There's probably more to this legislation than the paper is reporting, or at least I hope so.  But if their reporting is even 50% accurate, this sounds downright Orwellian.

Criminal Defense Lawyers Getting Rich Off the War on Drugs?

Connecticut Post columnist Ken Dixon wrote a column recently in part about the Green Party's stance towards decriminalizing drug possession.  He starts by mentioning the cost to the State for housing inmates.

I was glad to see the article published, because I fully support any small nudge towards sensible drug policy in this country, and it has to begin with decriminalization.  However, I have to profess I was amused by this part of the article:

At the intake end of the system, defense lawyers make millions trying to keep dealers and users out of the slammer. So if the Green's ideas of decriminalizing small amounts of marijuana and turning cocaine and heroin into prescription drugs were realized, does that mean more defense lawyers would be driving Chevys instead of Mercedes?

I suppose it is technically true that "defense lawyers make millions" on all cases combined, because there are millions arrested for drug offenses.  However, unlike TV and the movies, where "drug dealers" bring suitcases full of money to their lawyer's office on a regular basis, in real life the truth is that defense attorneys often charge very low amounts for representation on drug charges, compared to other offenses that carry the same or similar penalties. 

Personally, I do that for two reasons: #1) the truth is, low level offenders make up most of those arrested for drug crimes, and they don't have much money to start with and #2) more importantly, I charge less often in these cases for philosophical reasons.  I have always been a supporter of decriminalization.

Almost every criminal defense lawyer I know (and some prosecutors) fully support decriminalization efforts which would theoretically take money out of their pockets.  Ever heard of the NORML Legal Committee?  It's made up of defense lawyers, not prosecutors, I assure you.

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Texas Penal Code Chapter 33 Computer Crimes

Chapter 33 Computer Crimes Section 33.01 Definitions - Texas Penal Code

§ 33.01. Definitions

In this chapter:

(1) "Access" means to approach, instruct, communicate with, store data in, retrieve or intercept data from, alter data or computer software in, or otherwise make use of any resource of a computer, computer network, computer program, or computer system.

(2) "Aggregate amount" means the amount of:

(A) any direct or indirect loss incurred by a victim, including the value of money, property, or service stolen or rendered unrecoverable by the offense; or

(B) any expenditure required by the victim to verify that a computer, computer network, computer program, or computer system was not altered, acquired, damaged, deleted, or disrupted by the offense.

(3) "Communications common carrier" means a person who owns or operates a telephone system in this state that includes equipment or facilities for the conveyance, transmission, or reception of communications and who receives compensation from persons who use that system.

(4) "Computer" means an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high-speed data processing device that performs logical, arithmetic, or memory functions by the manipulations of electronic or magnetic impulses and includes all input, output, processing, storage, or communication facilities that are connected or related to the device.

(5) "Computer network" means the interconnection of two or more computers or computer systems by satellite, microwave, line, or other communication medium with the capability to transmit information among the computers.

(6) "Computer program" means an ordered set of data representing coded instructions or statements that when executed by a computer cause the computer to process data or perform specific functions.

(7) "Computer services" means the product of the use of a computer, the information stored in the computer, or the personnel supporting the computer, including computer time, data processing, and storage functions.

(8) "Computer system" means any combination of a computer or computer network with the documentation, computer software, or physical facilities supporting the computer or computer network.

(9) "Computer software" means a set of computer programs, procedures, and associated documentation related to the operation of a computer, computer system, or computer network.

(10) "Computer virus" means an unwanted computer program or other set of instructions inserted into a computer's memory, operating system, or program that is specifically constructed with the ability to replicate itself or to affect the other programs or files in the computer by attaching a copy of the unwanted program or other set of instructions to one or more computer programs or files.

(11) "Data" means a representation of information, knowledge, facts, concepts, or instructions that is being prepared or has been prepared in a formalized manner and is intended to be stored or processed, is being stored or processed, or has been stored or processed in a computer. Data may be embodied in any form, including but not limited to computer printouts, magnetic storage media, laser storage media, and punchcards, or may be stored internally in the memory of the computer.

(12) "Effective consent" includes consent by a person legally authorized to act for the owner. Consent is not effective if:

(A) induced by deception, as defined by Section 31.01, or induced by coercion;

(B) given by a person the actor knows is not legally authorized to act for the owner;

(C) given by a person who by reason of youth, mental disease or defect, or intoxication is known by the actor to be unable to make reasonable property dispositions;

(D) given solely to detect the commission of an offense; or

(E) used for a purpose other than that for which the consent was given.

(13) "Electric utility" has the meaning assigned by Section 31.002, Utilities Code.

(14) "Harm" includes partial or total alteration, damage, or erasure of stored data, interruption of computer services, introduction of a computer virus, or any other loss, disadvantage, or injury that might reasonably be suffered as a result of the actor's conduct.

(15) "Owner" means a person who:

(A) has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor;

(B) has the right to restrict access to the property; or

(C) is the licensee of data or computer software.

(16) "Property" means:

(A) tangible or intangible personal property including a computer, computer system, computer network, computer software, or data; or

(B) the use of a computer, computer system, computer network, computer software, or data.

Definition of Breach of Computer Security - Texas Penal Code Section 33.02

§ 33.02. Breach of Computer Security

(a) A person commits an offense if the person knowingly accesses a computer, computer network, or computer system without the effective consent of the owner.

(b) An offense under this section is a Class B misdemeanor unless in committing the offense the actor knowingly obtains a benefit, defrauds or harms another, or alters, damages, or deletes property, in which event the offense is:

(1) a Class A misdemeanor if the aggregate amount involved is less than $1,500;

(2) a state jail felony if:

(A) the aggregate amount involved is $1,500 or more but less than $20,000; or

(B) the aggregate amount involved is less than $1,500 and the defendant has been previously convicted two or more times of an offense under this chapter;

(3) a felony of the third degree if the aggregate amount involved is $20,000 or more but less than $100,000;

(4) a felony of the second degree if the aggregate amount involved is $100,000 or more but less than $200,000; or

(5) a felony of the first degree if the aggregate amount involved is $200,000 or more.

(c) When benefits are obtained, a victim is defrauded or harmed, or property is altered, damaged, or deleted in violation of this section, whether or not in a single incident, the conduct may be considered as one offense and the value of the benefits obtained and of the losses incurred because of the fraud, harm, or alteration, damage, or deletion of property may be aggregated in determining the grade of the offense.

(d) A person who his subject to prosecution under this section and any other section of this code may be prosecuted under either or both sections.

Definition of Online Solicitation of a Minor - Texas Penal Code Section 33.021

§ 33.021. Online Solicitation of a Minor

(a) In this section:

(1) "Minor" means:

(A) an individual who represents himself or herself to be younger than 17 years of age; or

(B) an individual whom the actor believes to be younger than 17 years of age.

(2) "Sexual contact," "sexual intercourse," and "deviate sexual intercourse" have the meanings assigned by Section 21.01.

(3) "Sexually explicit" means any communication, language, or material, including a photographic or video image, that relates to or describes sexual conduct, as defined by Section 43.25.

(b) A person who is 17 years of age or older commits an offense if, with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, the person, over the Internet or by electronic mail or a commercial online service, intentionally:

(1) communicates in a sexually explicit manner with a minor; or

(2) distributes sexually explicit material to a minor.

(c) A person commits an offense if the person, over the Internet or by electronic mail or a commercial online service, knowingly solicits a minor to meet another person, including the actor, with the intent that the minor will engage in sexual contact, sexual intercourse, or deviate sexual intercourse with the actor or another person.

(d) It is not a defense to prosecution under Subsection (c) that:

(1) the meeting did not occur;

(2) the actor did not intend for the meeting to occur; or

(3) the actor was engaged in a fantasy at the time of commission of the offense.

(e) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that at the time conduct described by Subsection (b) or (c) was committed:

(1) the actor was married to the minor; or

(2) the actor was not more than three years older than the minor and the minor consented to the conduct.

(f) An offense under Subsection (b) is a state jail felony, and an offense under Subsection (c) is a felony of the third degree, except that an offense under Subsection (b) or (c) is a felony of the second degree if the minor is younger than 14 years of age or is an individual whom the actor believes to be younger than 14 years of age.

(g) If conduct that constitutes an offense under this section also constitutes an offense under any other law, the actor may be prosecuted under this section, the other law, or both.

Defenses - Texas Penal Code Section 33.03

§ 33.03.  Defenses

It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under Section 33.02 that the actor was an officer, employee, or agent of a communications common carrier or electric utility and committed the proscribed act or acts in the course of employment while engaged in an activity that is a necessary incident to the rendition of service or to the protection of the rights or property of the communications common carrier or electric utility.

Assistance by Attorney General - Texas Penal Code Section 33.04

§ 33.04. Assistance by Attorney General

The attorney general, if requested to do so by a prosecuting attorney, may assist the prosecuting attorney in the investigation or prosecution of an offense under this chapter or of any other offense involving the use of a computer.

Tampering with Direct Recording Electronic Voting Machine - Texas Penal Code Section 33.05

§ 33.05. Tampering with Direct Recording Electronic Voting Machine

(a) In this section:

(1) "Direct recording electronic voting machine" has the meaning assigned by Section 121.003, Election Code.

(2) "Measure" has the meaning assigned by Section 1.005, Election Code.

(b) A person commits an offense if the person knowingly accesses a computer, computer network, computer program, computer software, or computer system that is a part of a voting system that uses direct recording electronic voting machines and by means of that access:

(1) prevents a person from lawfully casting a vote;

(2) changes a lawfully cast vote;

(3) prevents a lawfully cast vote from being counted; or

(4) causes a vote that was not lawfully cast to be counted.

(c) An offense under this section does not require that the votes as affected by the person's actions described by Subsection (b) actually be the votes used in the official determination of the outcome of the election.

(d) An offense under this section is a felony of the first degree.

(e) Notwithstanding Section 15.01(d), an offense under Section 15.01(a) is a felony of the third degree if the offense the actor intends to commit is an offense under this section.

Blog Purpose

I am starting this blog for a variety of reasons.

This blog will cover topics about the defense of criminal charges, mostly relating to Texas State Court criminal charges.  That focus will also include the need to talk about general principles of criminal law, and how they apply to the Texas Penal Code.

I hope it will be of service to other lawyers, journalists looking for information about criminal defense in Texas, and, of course, people who have been arrested and are currently facing charges in Texas State County or District Court.

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Definition of Improper Photography or Visual Recording - Texas Penal Code Section 21.15

§ 21.15. IMPROPER PHOTOGRAPHY OR VISUAL RECORDING. 

a) In this section, "promote" has the meaning assigned by Section 43.21.

b) A person commits an offense if the person:

(1) photographs or by videotape or other electronic means visually records another:

(A) without the other person's consent; and

(B) with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person; or

(2) knowing the character and content of the photograph or recording, promotes a photograph or visual recording described by Subdivision (1).

c) An offense under this section is a state jail felony.

d) If conduct that constitutes an offense under this section also constitutes an offense under any other law, the actor may be prosecuted under this section or the other law.

Definition of Improper Relationship Between Educator and Student - Texas Penal Code Section 21.12

§ 21.12 IMPROPER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EDUCATOR AND STUDENT. 

(a) An employee of a public or private primary or secondary school commits an offense if the employee engages in sexual contact, sexual intercourse, or deviate sexual intercourse with a person who is enrolled in a public or private primary or secondary school at which the employee works and who is not the employee's spouse.

(b) An offense under this section is a felony of the second degree.

(c) If conduct constituting an offense under this section also constitutes an offense under another section of this code, the actor may be prosecuted under either section or both sections.

Definition of Indecency with a Child - Texas Penal Code Section 21.11

§ 21.11. INDECENCY WITH A CHILD. 

(a) A person commits an offense if, with a child younger than 17 years and not the person's spouse, whether the child is of the same or opposite sex, the person:

(1) engages in sexual contact with the child or causes the child to engage in sexual contact; or

(2) with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person:

(A) exposes the person's anus or any part of the person's genitals, knowing the child is present; or

(B) causes the child to expose the child's anus or any part of the child's genitals.

(b) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the actor:

(1) was not more than three years older than the victim and of the opposite sex;

(2) did not use duress, force, or a threat against the victim at the time of the offense; and

(3) at the time of the offense:

(A) was not required under Chapter 62, Code of Criminal Procedure, to register for life as a sex offender; or

(B) was not a person who under Chapter 62 had a reportable conviction or adjudication for an offense under this section.

(c) In this section, "sexual contact" means the following acts, if committed with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person:

(1) any touching by a person, including touching through clothing, of the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals of a child; or

(2) any touching of any part of the body of a child, including touching through clothing, with the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals of a person.

(d) An offense under Subsection (a)(1) is a felony of the second degree and an offense under Subsection (a)(2) is a felony of the third degree.

Definition of Indecent Exposure - Texas Penal Code Section 21.08

§ 21.08 INDECENT EXPOSURE.  

(a) A person commits an offense if he exposes his anus or any part of his genitals with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, and he is reckless about whether another is present who will be offended or alarmed by his act.

(b) An offense under this section is a Class B misdemeanor.

Definition of Public Lewdness - Texas Penal Code Section 21.07

§ 21.07 PUBLIC LEWDNESS. (a) A person commits an offense if he knowingly engages in any of the following acts in a public place or, if not in a public place, he is reckless about whether another is present who will be offended or alarmed by his:

(1) act of sexual intercourse;

(2) act of deviate sexual intercourse;

(3) act of sexual contact; or

(4) act involving contact between the person's mouth or genitals and the anus or genitals of an animal or fowl.

(b) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

Definition of Homosexual Conduct - Texas Penal Code Section 21.06

§ 21.06. HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT.

[This section was declared unconstitutional by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472.]

(a) A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.

(b) An offense under this section is a Class C misdemeanor.

Chapter 21 Sexual Offenses Section 21.01 Definitions

§ 21.01. DEFINITIONS. In this chapter:

(1) "Deviate sexual intercourse" means:

(A) any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person; or

(B) the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object.

(2) "Sexual contact" means, except as provided by Section 21.11, any touching of the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals of another person with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.

(3) "Sexual intercourse" means any penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ.

(4) "Spouse" means a person to whom a person is legally married under Subtitle A, Title 1, Family Code, or a comparable law of another jurisdiction.

Texas Penal Code Chapter 21 Sexual Offenses

Definition of Theft (Long Version) - Texas Penal Code

§ 31.03. THEFT.

(a) A person commits an offense if he unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of property.

(b) Appropriation of property is unlawful if:                                

            (1) it is without the owner's effective consent;                    

            (2) the property is stolen and the actor appropriates the property knowing it was stolen by another; or

            (3) property in the custody of any law enforcement agency was explicitly represented by any law enforcement agent to the actor as being stolen and the actor appropriates the property believing it was stolen by another.

(c) For purposes of Subsection (b):                                         

            (1) evidence that the actor has previously participated in recent transactions other than, but similar to, that which the prosecution is based is admissible for the purpose of showing knowledge or intent and the issues of knowledge or intent are raised by the actor's plea of not guilty;

            (2) the testimony of an accomplice shall be corroborated by proof that tends to connect the actor to the crime, but the actor's knowledge or intent may be established by the uncorroborated testimony of the accomplice;

            (3) an actor engaged in the business of buying and selling used or secondhand personal property, or lending money on the security of personal property deposited with the actor, is presumed to know upon receipt by the actor of stolen property (other than a motor vehicle subject to Chapter 501, Transportation Code) that the property has been previously stolen from another if the actor pays for or loans against the property $25 or more (or consideration of equivalent value) and the actor knowingly or recklessly:

                        (A) fails to record the name, address, and physical description or identification number of the seller or pledgor;

                        (B) fails to record a complete description of the property, including the serial number, if reasonably available, or other identifying characteristics; or

                        (C) fails to obtain a signed warranty from the seller or pledgor that the seller or pledgor has the right to possess the property. It is the express intent of this provision that the presumption arises unless the actor complies with each of the numbered requirements;

            (4) for the purposes of Subdivision (3)(A), "identification number" means driver's license number, military identification number, identification certificate, or other official number capable of identifying an individual;

            (5) stolen property does not lose its character as stolen when recovered by any law enforcement agency;

            (6) an actor engaged in the business of obtaining abandoned or wrecked motor vehicles or parts of an abandoned or wrecked motor vehicle for resale, disposal, scrap, repair, rebuilding, demolition, or other form of salvage is presumed to know on receipt by the actor of stolen property that the property has been previously stolen from another if the actor knowingly or recklessly:

                        (A) fails to maintain an accurate and legible inventory of each motor vehicle component part purchased by or delivered to the actor, including the date of purchase or delivery, the name, age, address, sex, and driver's license number of the

seller or person making the delivery, the license plate number of the motor vehicle in which the part was delivered, a complete description of the part, and the vehicle identification number of the motor vehicle from which the part was removed, or in lieu of maintaining an inventory, fails to record the name and certificate of inventory number of the person who dismantled the motor vehicle from which the part was obtained;

                        (B) fails on receipt of a motor vehicle to obtain a certificate of authority, sales receipt, or transfer document as required by Chapter 683, Transportation Code, or a certificate of title showing that the motor vehicle is not subject to a lien or that all recorded liens on the motor vehicle have been released; or

                        (C) fails on receipt of a motor vehicle to immediately remove an unexpired license plate from the motor vehicle, to keep the plate in a secure and locked place, or to maintain an inventory, on forms provided by the Texas Department of Transportation, of license plates kept under this paragraph, including for each plate or set of plates the license plate number and the make, motor number, and vehicle identification number of the motor vehicle from which the plate was removed;

            (7) an actor who purchases or receives a used or secondhand motor vehicle is presumed to know on receipt by the actor of the motor vehicle that the motor vehicle has been previously stolen from another if the actor knowingly or recklessly:

                        (A) fails to report to the Texas Department of Transportation the failure of the person who sold or delivered the motor vehicle to the actor to deliver to the actor a properly executed certificate of title to the motor vehicle at the time the motor vehicle was delivered; or

                        (B) fails to file with the county tax assessor-collector of the county in which the actor received the motor vehicle, not later than the 20th day after the date the actor received the motor vehicle, the registration license receipt and certificate of title or evidence of title delivered to the actor in accordance with Subchapter D, Chapter 520, Transportation Code, at the time the motor vehicle was delivered; 

            (8) an actor who purchases or receives from any source other than a licensed retailer or distributor of pesticides a restricted-use pesticide or a state-limited-use pesticide or a compound, mixture, or preparation containing a restricted-use or state-limited-use pesticide is presumed to know on receipt by the actor of the pesticide or compound, mixture, or preparation that the pesticide or compound, mixture, or preparation has been previously stolen from another if the actor:

                        (A) fails to record the name, address, and physical description of the seller or pledgor;

                        (B) fails to record a complete description of the amount and type of pesticide or compound, mixture, or preparation purchased or received; and

                        (C) fails to obtain a signed warranty from the seller or pledgor that the seller or pledgor has the right to possess the property; and

            (9) an actor who is subject to Section 409, Packers and Stockyards Act (7 U.S.C. Section 228b), that obtains livestock from a commission merchant by representing that the actor will make prompt payment is presumed to have induced the commission merchant's consent by deception if the actor fails to make full payment in accordance with Section 409, Packers and Stockyards Act (7 U.S.C. Section 228b).

(d) It is not a defense to prosecution under this section that:           

            (1) the offense occurred as a result of a deception or strategy on the part of a law enforcement agency, including the use of an undercover operative or peace officer;

            (2) the actor was provided by a law enforcement agency with a facility in which to commit the offense or an opportunity to engage in conduct constituting the offense; or

            (3) the actor was solicited to commit the offense by a peace officer, and the solicitation was of a type that would encourage a person predisposed to commit the offense to actually commit the offense, but would not encourage a person not predisposed to commit the offense to actually commit the offense.

(e) Except as provided by Subsection (f), an offense under this section is:

            (1) a Class C misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less than:

                        (A) $50; or                                                               

                        (B) $20 and the defendant obtained the property by issuing or passing a check or similar sight order in a manner described by Section 31.06;

            (2) a Class B misdemeanor if:                                               

                        (A) the value of the property stolen is:                                   

                                    (i) $50 or more but less than $500; or                                   

                                    (ii) $20 or more but less than $500 and the defendant obtained the property by issuing or passing a check or similar sight order in a manner described by Section 31.06; or

                        (B) the value of the property stolen is less than:                       

                                    (i) $50 and the defendant has previously been convicted of any grade of theft; or

                                    (ii) $20, the defendant has previously been convicted of any grade of theft, and the defendant obtained the property by issuing or passing a check or similar sight order in a manner described by Section 31.06;

            (3) a Class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is $500 or more but less than $1,500;

            (4) a state jail felony if:                                                 

                        (A) the value of the property stolen is $1,500 or more but less than $20,000, or the property is less than 10 head of cattle, horses, or exotic livestock or exotic fowl as defined by Section 142.001, Agriculture Code, or any part thereof under the value of $20,000, or less than 100 head of sheep, swine, or goats or any part thereof under the value of $20,000;

                        (B) regardless of value, the property is stolen from the person of another or from a human corpse or grave;

                        (C) the property stolen is a firearm, as defined by Section 46.01;       

                        (D) the value of the property stolen is less than $1,500 and the defendant has been previously convicted two or more times of any grade of theft; or

                        (E) the property stolen is an official ballot or official carrier envelope for an election;

            (5) a felony of the third degree if the value of the property stolen is $20,000 or more but less than $100,000, or the property is:

                        (A) 10 or more head of cattle, horses, or exotic livestock or exotic fowl as defined by Section 142.001, Agriculture Code, stolen during a single transaction and having an aggregate value of less than $100,000; or

                        (B) 100 or more head of sheep, swine, or goats stolen during a single transaction and having an aggregate value of less than $100,000;

            (6) a felony of the second degree if the value of the property stolen is $100,000 or more but less than $200,000; or

            (7) a felony of the first degree if the value of the property stolen is $200,000 or more.

(f) An offense described for purposes of punishment by Subsections (e)(1)-(6) is increased to the next higher category of offense if it is shown on the trial of the offense that:           

(1) the actor was a public servant at the time of the offense and the property appropriated came into the actor's custody, possession, or control by virtue of his status as a public servant;

            (2) the actor was in a contractual relationship with government at the time of the offense and the property appropriated came into the actor's custody, possession, or control by virtue of the contractual relationship; or

            (3) the owner of the property appropriated was at the time of the offense an elderly individual.

(g) For the purposes of Subsection (a), a person is the owner of exotic livestock or exotic fowl as defined by Section 142.001, Agriculture Code, only if the person qualifies to claim the animal under Section 142.0021, Agriculture Code, if the animal is an estray.

(h) In this section:                                                          

            (1) "Restricted-use pesticide" means a pesticide classified as a restricted-use pesticide by the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency under 7 U.S.C. Section 136a, as that law existed on January 1, 1995, and containing an active ingredient listed in the federal regulations adopted under that law (40 C.F.R. Section 152.175) and in effect on that date.

            (2) "State-limited-use pesticide" means a pesticide classified as a state-limited-use pesticide by the Department of Agriculture under Section 76.003, Agriculture Code, as that section existed on January 1, 1995, and containing an active ingredient listed in the rules adopted under that section (4 TAC Section 7.24) as that section existed on that date.

(i) For purposes of Subsection (c)(9), "livestock" and "commission merchant" have the meanings assigned by Section 147.001, Agriculture Code.

(j) With the consent of the appropriate local county or district attorney, the attorney general has concurrent jurisdiction with that consenting local prosecutor to prosecute an offense under this section that involves the state Medicaid program.

Definition of Theft (Short Version) - Texas Penal Code

§ 31.03. THEFT.

 

(a) A person commits an offense if he unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of property.

 

(b)  Appropriation of property is unlawful if:   

                            

            (1)  it is without the owner's effective consent; 

                    

            (2)  the property is stolen and the actor appropriates the property knowing it was stolen by another;  or

 

            (3)  property in the custody of any law enforcement agency was explicitly represented by any law enforcement agent to the actor as being stolen and the actor appropriates the property believing it was stolen by another.

Notice of Change of Address or Name - Texas Transportation Code Section 521.054

§ 521.054. Notice of Change of Address or Name

(a) This section applies to a person who:

(1)  after applying for the license or certificate moves from the address stated in the person's application for a license or certificate;

(2) moves from the address shown on the license or certificate held by the person; or

(3) changes the person's name by marriage or otherwise.

(b) A person subject to this section shall notify the department of the change not later than the 30th day after the date on which the change takes effect and apply for a duplicate license or certificate as provided by Section 521.146.

(c) A person changing the person's address shall notify the department of the old and new addresses and the number of the license or certificate held by the person. A person changing the person's name shall notify the department of the former and new names and the number of the license or certificate held by the person.

[End of Statute]

Note: I am sometimes asked, "If I change my address, do I have to notify DPS?"  The answer is you have 30 days, otherwise if stopped, the officer can issue you a Class C citation.  (Of course, if you are polite, which is always a good policy, you might just be issued a warning.)

Also, there are practical reasons why it's a good idea to keep DPS updated.